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II.—ON SOME KINDS OF NECESSAEY TBUTH. (II.)1
By LESLIE STEPHEN.
I ENDEAVOURED in my preceding paper to trace theprocess
by which we are led to form the conception of Time as
something independent and definitely measurable. I
proceed to speak of the analogous question of Space.
In speaking of this—the most difficult problem—I must
begin by saying distinctly what are the limits within which
I must confine myself. I know, I am sorry to say, very
little indeed of the recent investigations into the mode
by which wo learn to organise the various intimations
of space-properties. "When I read Prof. James's articles, I
accept them as an ignoramus listening to the statements of
an expert. I have no independent opinion whatever in the
matter. I should, therefore, be silent were it not that I
fancy that there is a logical question as to the meaning of
our judgments of space, which is independent of a detailed
knowledge of the complex system of sense-signals by which
our judgment is formed. I am very likely quite mistaken ;
but one erroneous speculation more or less in this matter is
hardly worth counting; and I shall simply give my view—
without stopping at every instant to insert professions of
incompetence—as though I were dogmatically certain.
A space-judgment is so far like a time-judgment that it is
a statement of a relation between two phenomena. We
have to find a common measure—a value of one space-
relation in terms of others. Ultimately we say this distance
iB equal to, or in a certain numerical proportion to, another.
And, as in time, we have to take some perfectly arbitrary
unit. We know a minute only as the sixtieth part of an
hour; and we fix the hour by its relation to a particular day
—the 1st of January, 1887, for example. In the same way,
a foot is a certain fraction of a mile, or a mile a certain
multiple of a foot. The ultimate unit is arbitrary, the
length of Edward I.'s arm, or a standard piece of metal at
the Tower, or the length of the earth's diameter. There-
fore, the statement that a thing is of certain length is a
statement that it bears a certain numerical relation to some
other thing; that it would precisely coincide with it if they
1
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ON SOME KINDS OP NECESSABT TRUTH, ( n ) . 189
were placed together, or exceed, or fall Bhort of it. We
have the advantage that we can actually bring things to-
gether which we cannot in time ; but, on the other hand,
a whole system of complex propositions results from the
attempt to give general rules as to their coincidence or
otherwise.
First of all, then, can we say anything more about this
coincidence ? When do we call a distance ' constant,' or
say that two separate things would coincide ? It is clear
that we only know of Bpace-qualities through various sensa-
tions—smells, sounds, sights, touches, and so forth. The
identity, therefore, of two objects in point of space must
mean that under the same circumstances they would cause
the same sensations. Here, again, we adopt certain familiar
artifices. We clearly regard smells and sounds, and in a
less obvious way sights, as indications of something else.
They are signals of something; they do not enter into our
ultimate judgments. I hear a sound and infer a bell, that
is, a visible, tangible, resisting something. But my inference
is not verified. I can see nothing and touch nothing cor-
responding to bell. Then I reject my previous inference.
I correct it by interpreting the sound as meaning a bell in a
different position, or, in the last resort, I set it down as an
illusion. The sound must have been a singing in my ears,
or such a fancy as Clapperton's when he was dying in Africa.
By such an understanding it is easy to make things pleasant.
We reject inconsistent experience because inconsistent, as
we did in the case of time. Therefore, a sound is not an
ultimate authority, but only gives primd facie testimony.
And the same is true of sight. I see a man, and my hand
goes through him. Therefore, he is a ghost, not a man
—or unreal. I see a surface in relief. My touch tells me
that it is fiat. Therefore, my eve kindly conforms to my
fingers, or, if it will not, I disbelieve its testimony. It
follows, it would seem, that a judgment as to distance is
not a judgment about sounds or sights in the last resort.
They indicate something else; they do not prove. This
must be so, because I make it so, by instantly rejecting
their testimony when it does not correspond to other testi-
mony. The process is analogous to that already considered
in regard to time, and corresponds, I presume, to one of
the instinctive processes which physiologists can trace and
analyse. At any rate, I have so managed matters that only
one conclusion is possible. I have decided to reject all
inconsistent testimony as inconsistent.
What, then, is the final authority to which all others
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190 L. STEPHEN :
have to conform ? When I say that a thing is at a certain
distance I mean that it is or is not ' within reach'; and
this means that a certain touch will be reproduced by a
certain extension, or, of course, a certain system of touches
by a corresponding system of movements. I use the word
' extension' in the vaguest possible sense, meaning that
sensation, whatever it may be, which corresponds to reaching
a given object. In order to make the statement accurate,
we have, of course, as in the case of time, to substitute an
objective and constant standard for the variable standard
assumed in the first instance. But the question is, In
respect of what is it taken to be constant ? If I say that a
thing is at a fixed distance, I do not assume a constant
affection of the hearing or sight as given by that simple
statement; I regard those sensations as signals of some-
thing else, and therefore their testimony as liable to be
overridden by other testimony. I always assume, however,
that the extension necessary to reach the object remains
constant; that is, the extension due to the action of the
normal or standard human being. "Whatever errors may be
made are corrected by reference not to some other criterion
but by a due admission of the possibility of personal varia-
tion. If I am more tired at one moment than at another,
the effort required to make a given extension will be greater.
This correction is enforced upon me in the attempt to con-
struct an objective world, and in applying it we act precisely
as we do in other cases. We may assume the amount of
effort to be measurable by some common and fixed standard.
Supposing this to be done, by saying that a thing is
at fixed distance, we necessarily imply that it can be
reached by a fixed effort. The precise effort which we
have to make at a given moment is of course variable;
but the distance is made constant by the hypothesis that
the change of effort is due to such a change, and to such a
change alone ; or, in other words, the real distance remains
the same if this effort measured by the objective standard
remains fixed. And, inversely, if more or less effort is
required, we necessarily suppose the distance to be increased
or diminished. The space-judgment, then, must at least
include, and appears essentially to consist in, this judgment.
Here, in short, is the independent variable to which a
reference is explicitly or implicitly made in every judgment
of distance. I, or rather the normal man, could not reach
an object at that distance by a given effort.
This, as I understand, corresponds to the assertion that
our judgment of space is formed from the ' muscular
t :'. «
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ON 80MB KINDS OF NECESSABY TBUTH. (n . ) 191
sensations'. Now this seems to imply a difficulty. The
supposed unit in which our judgment has ultimately to
express itself is so vague that it seems incapable of giving
rise to any accurate judgments, especially to the most pre-
cise of all possible judgments. It may—it seems that it
must—be somehow latent in the judgment; but it is not
the actual judgment. Nothing, certainly, can be vaguer
than the muscular sensation itself. If we take such a
familiar example as the skilled billiard player, we have an
obvious illustration of the case. A stroke has to be
delivered in a certain direction with a certain force at a
certain part of one ball so that it may move with a certain
velocity, strike another ball with a certain momentum, and
set up a certain set of subsequent movements. It would
tax trie ablest mathematician to determine the exact posi-
tion in which the cue is to be placed and the force of the
blow to be struck. Again, the original data, the positions of
the cue, ball and so forth, have to be determined from certain
visual and other sensations, which involve complex pro-
blems of perspective, and therefore of geometry. If a
specified and highly discriminated sensation corresponded
to each position of the arm so that the right one could be
picked out by the performer, we could partly understand
the marvellous accuracy of his performance. But in point
of fact this sensation seems to be of the very vaguest Kind.
All that takes place, so far as we can observe, is that he
foresees what is going to happen, and that, therefore, it does
happen. The sensations somehow solve all these amazingly
intricate problems for themselvea And what is done by a
billiard-player or a fiddler is only a further refinement of
what everyone of us does in learning to walk or to talk,
and what a swallow does when it catches an insect on the
wing, or a tern when it plunges into the sea to seize a
sand-eel. How the organism acquires these indefinitely
delicate adjustments is a problem for the physiologist, at
which I can only glance and pass by. My only purpose is
to emphasise the smgular vagueness of the muscular sensa-
tion which seems to be implied in the corresponding move-
ments. If my hand and arm do so exactly what I want
them to do, there must, one supposes, be some difference of
sensation implied in the minutest change of position. Yet
if there be one it is so slight as to be quite inappreciable in
the developed consciousness, and we do not see how it can
be discriminated from its proximate neighbour. I pick out,
it seems, one pin from a million all indistinguishable in
appearance, and I do it with unfailing accuracy. I do not
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192 L. STEPHEN :
recognise the sensation by itself, but only as that which
corresponds to some visual or tactual or audible sensation.
This, I observe, may equally be said of the vague feeling
of duration. Accurate judgments of time enter into our
actions as much as accurate judgments of space. When a
man shoots a bird flying, he must implicitly estimate with
extraordinary nicety the distance which it moves in a given
period. If he shuts his eyes and tries to measure a period
by his time-sensation, he will probably find himself hope-
lessly at a loss. If he looks at the bird flying, he will cause
another body to move rapidly so as to intersect the line
of flight at a given distance. The accuracy of judgment,
therefore, does not depend upon his accurate perception of
time considered abstractedly, but upon his accurate inter-
pretation of certain visual symbols.
Now, I think that it is precisely this extreme vagueness
which enables us to form necessary judgments, although we
must look elsewhere to understand their extreme nicety.
But, in order to show this more clearly, we must go a little
further into the nature of the judgments which we actually
form—whatever the complexity of the system of sensible
signals by which we are enabled to form them. To take
the simplest example, we may suppose that we see a marble,
a hard, spherical object, revealed in the first instance per-
haps by sight. We determine the position in space, the
shape and size by putting out our hand and grasping it,
rejecting all indications from the eye which are incom-
patible with the sensations given by the muscular action.
If the marble moves, a different effort is required to reach
any point of the surface, but the same sensations which
determine the shape and size recur. The arm is extended
further or not so far, and revives the same series of grasps
and touches. Suppose, again, that the marble is made of
putty, and that therefore whilst it is at the same distance it
changes shape upon pressure. How do we interpret such
a simple series of sensations ? The hard, incompressible
marble is taken to be the same thing, because it corresponds
to the same system of touches and pressures. But they
are revivable by different extensions. The marble therefore
is at a different distance. When we press the putty again,
it corresponds to a different series of touches. We explain
this by saving that the thing has changed its shape.
Now, I say, these inferences or modes of interpretation,
virtually construct space as we before constructed time
by help of an assumption that all the sensations shall be
made consistent. For the same thing (that is, the same
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in shape-relations) is denned to be that which produces the
same series of sensations. If the same series of touches
recurs after a different extension, we explain this either by
supposing a second thing differing from the first in distance
alone, or by supposing the thing to have moved to a diffe-
rent distance. In the latter case we suppose a change in
the space-relations of the whole, though the relations
between the various parts of the thing remain constant.
We suppose that the thing has moved, and therefore that it
might De replaced so as again to produce precisely the old
sensations if the change were reversed; and further, that it
actually does or might produce the same sensations upon
another being, or upon ourselves after a supposed change in
our own relations. And if, after all, this should not be
verified, we suppose the thing itself to have changed. These
hypotheses will enable us to reconcile any conceivable
changes in our sensations, and since we have started from
the assumption that the changes are to be reconciled, we
naturally reach the result already predetermined in our
assumption.
To work out the precise process by which the reconcilia-
tion is effected would be no doubt very difficult, and is in
any case quite beyond my capacity. But it is easy enough
to assign a hypothetical process by which some of the con-
clusions actually attained might be suggested, and which will
perhaps show more clearly what I conceive them to be.
we may, in the first place, imagine a being absolutely fixed,
or, what is the same thing, accounting for everything by its
varying distances from himself. So far as purely geometrical
considerations are concerned, such a hypothesis is always
possible at any stage of thought. Physical observations
force us to make the hypothesis that we change our place as
weD as objects around us. But, from a purely geometrical
point of view, all experience may be made coherent by
assuming ourselves or any point in the universe to be
absolutely fixed; or, in other words, by measuring all dis-
tances from any assumed origin. We may imagine, then, a
fixed being (or a being who chooses to measure from himself
as the origin) to recognise the world within his reach. Each
object will then be definable as that which produces a
certain sensation of touch when he makes a certain move-
ment corresponding to some fixed muscular sensation. By
renewing the same effort he reproduces the same series of
sensations. He thus acquires a certain definite framework
of regularly recurrent sensations. In fact we form such a
framework, consisting of our habitual environment, room,
13
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194 L. STEPHEN :
house, country, and ultimately solar system, to which we
refer in order to obtain our bearings. But, as many things
move, there are some sensations which do not recur. "When
I moved my hand along the table I met an obstacle—a
matchbox—at a given distance. I and the table are still
where they were. I revive, that is, precisely the same series
of sensible impressions of the tabla But the matchbox
has moved. To revive that series of impressions I must
make a greater extension. How do I explain the change ?
I assume none in myself. Nor do I say, as I apparently
might, that there is now more ' space' than there was. I do
not assume that the matchbox is a constant limit to space,
which would make the movement along the table variable in
fipite of the identity of that series of impressions; but I sup-
pose that the matchbox has moved, and that, instead of
limiting, it only filled space. I assume, to make my impres-
sions agree, that there was always a potential space, which
the matchbox did not annihilate, but rendered inaccessible for
the moment. The assumption leaves a certain difficulty, it
would seem, for we are always unable to imagine the in-
terior of solid bodies, and have to conceive them as made
up of a series of surfaces or of potential systems of resist-
ance indicated by potential touches. Thus, when we suppose
a body to move we do not suppose space to be altered ; but
we imagine that the space was always there potentially. We
act like the judicious lender of a book, who nils up the space
which itpreviouBly occupied on the shelves by a wooden
block. This artifice, then, is forced upon us by our resolu-
tion to preserve the harmony of our sensations. It enables
UB and compels us to preserve the original framework of
sensation entirely unaltered. It is not read off simply as a
set of permanent sensations, always to be evoked by a
repetition of precisely the same effort, nor as a simply
variable set of sensations, sometimes arising and sometimes
not arising in correspondence with a given series of efforts,
but as a set of permanent and absolutely unaltered and
unalterable seriea of potential efforts. And the different
sensations which occur are regarded as due to a change in
something independent of ourselves, and as always capable
of being referred to their proper place in the original frame-
work. Any inconsistency now becomes impossible, because
we take for granted that the observed differences are not to
be referred to a change in the effort itself, but to a change
arising elsewhere, and registered as different because occur-
ring in different parts of the same framework. We need
not, so far as the sensations themselves are concerned, have
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recourse to this system; but until we have recourse to it
the sensations must remain chaotic, grouped by no assign-
able rules, and therefore we have recourse to it.
A further step now becomes necessary. It would be so
far possible to interpret my sensations consistently, whilst
admitting qualitative differences between different regions
of space A set of sensations different in some respects
must occur when I move my hand upwards or downwards,
right or left, and so forth. Suppose, for example, that one
hand touches a given point on a table, whilst the other
rises to the lamp above it and then descends to the original
place. The effort of raising the hand will be different from
the effort in lowering it. So long as I simply regard the
corresponding sensations as a series of consecutive events,
there is in this no contradiction or difficulty. I might
simply recognise the two series as different, and believe
vaguely that the same would recur under the same circum-
stances. But, in point of fact, I make a more complex
hypothesis. The two points, the lamp and the table, repre-
sent fixed data in my framework of actual and potential
sensations. In order to carry out this hypothesis, I assume
that if the points are fixed the distance is fixed. When I
find that the actual effort implied in moving from one to
the other is different, I am not content to take the observa-
tion simply. I virtually split up the sensation into two, and
regard it as due partly to a uniform sensation, which corre-
sponds to space in itself, and partly to a variable set of
Bensations due to some other cause, as in this case to weight.
We suppose it to be a necessary truth that the distance
from the tip of the tiger's nose to the tip of his tail is the
same as the distance from the tip of his tail to the tip of his
nose. The showman who declares that there is a difference
makes a bull—a palpable contradiction in terms. If his
assertion merely referred to the effort involved in passing
our hand first one way and then another, it would not be
contradictory, though it might be inaccurate. Why, then,
is it absurd ? Because, by the length we mean the effort
due to the distance which is assumed to be constant—for
we don't suppose the tiger to grow, and the two move-
ments might be simultaneous. We have made an assump-
tion precisely the same as that which we make in the case
of touch. We discard differences because they are different;
that is, we set them down to some other cause. We have
to make such an assumption whenever we pronounce that
a thing which has changed its position is nevertheless the
same thing. This marble, for example, has moved ; it
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196 L. STBPHEN:
corresponds to a different set of sensations both of sight and
touch, and a different set of potential movements of grasp
and touch. We might explain this in various ways. Some
of the sensations suggest identity, whilst others suggest
change. We might be content to say, ' Here is a differing
set of sensations '. When we say, ' This is the very same
thing,' we virtually say, ' Here is one set of identical sensa-
tions plus another set of differing sensations '. We reconcile
the varying suggestions by supposing a uniform sensation
due to one cause, and varying sensations as due to another.
The movement through a certain quantity of space corre-
sponds to a uniform sensation, and so far as the sensations
vary they must be due to something else. We must do
something of the kind in order to preserve the uniformity
of our framework. If I say, This is the same room or the
same valley in which I was placed yesterday, it is not that
the sensations remain identical. The effort required to put
out my hand to the table or to move across the room varies
constantly with the state of my body. I might suppose the
house to grow larger with as much consistency as I might
suppose my sensations to vary. But it is more convenient
to regard it as the same house ; and in order that I may do
so, I must consider that a certain normal or standard sensa-
tion would correspond to crossing the room, and that the
difference is to be written off as due to something else—
fatigue, for example. All this comes simply to defining
space as that which does or would correspond to the normal
and uniform effort. And, as in the analogous case of time,
this involves a postulate which cannot be proved by direct
experience. I say, indeed, that I can do in regard of space-
measures what I cannot do in regard of time. I can bring
two objects into actual contact, and therefore assure myself
that they have certain definite relations in respect of length.
But, in order to do so, I have always to assume that one or
other of them is constant in respect of space. We take for
granted that certain objects which correspond to a varying
group of sensations are yet the same objects. Probably my
first measure is a bit of myself. We are our own compasses
as we are our own clocks. My foot is at first the measure
of everything, and afterwards a particular thing, a rod or the
diameter of the earth, which I take to be constant. Ulti-
mately I find, as in the case of time, that no definable thing
is absolutely constant in length. And whenever I measure
one thing by another, I must assume that the changing
group of sensations is the indication of an underlying uni-
formity with superficial variations. When I put my rod
 at The U
niversity of British Colom
bia Library on June 28, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
ON SOME KOTOS OP NECB88A3T TBUTH. (i l . ) 197
in successive positions along the base of the pyramid to
determine ita length, I am really putting whole series of
indefinitely varying sensations together; and it is only
because I assume that in some way they also correspond
to a series of uniform sensations that my process has any
validity. That we are right in supposing that any greater
thing is constant in length, as that we are right in supposing
a day or a year to be constant in time, is only to be provea
from the general harmony of experience thus interpreted.
One other remark must be added, which still corresponds
to the remarks made about time. The process involves a
separation of ' things' from ourselves, a belief that a thing,
as a hypothetical cause of sensations, remains constant,
though no longer represented by the same group of sensa-
tions. This becomes possible, however the process may
be interpreted, whenever we come to form the Hypothetical
systems of potential sensations which are necessary in order
to correlate our successive groups of actual sensations. And
this process becomes necessary whenever I recognise the
existence of other beings beside myself, and have to form
measures common to myself and others as well as to my
own successive states. There must be a corresponding
development of my space-world. It must be that in which
you and I live. It involves the possibility that I may move
as well as the things by which I am surrounded. I can
place myself at different points of the world I have now
constructed as well as suppose a different set of relations of
other things to myself. Tins must clearly correspond to an
important stage of development. The difficulty with which
it is effected seems to be indicated by the difficulty which
Btill clings to us even in the most advanced stage. I habitu-
ally think of myself as moving, for I have learnt to think of
the world as being equally measurable from your point of
view or mine. But I still find it very difficult, to think of
the world common to me and the other persons actually
known to me as movable. So much of the old mode of
thought still survives, in spite of successive abstractions,
that I naturally think of my up and down as absolute and
universal, find a difficulty in conceiving of the antipodes as
real, and habitually take the earth as the centre of all things.
It is only when I have applied myself for some time to geo-
metry that I can firmly nold to an abstract space as some-
thing absolutely uniform and identical in all its parts.
So far it would seem that the process by which we develop
the conception of space is precisely analogous to that by
which we develop the conception of time. That is to say,
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198 L. STEPHEN :
the conception is forced unon us in the same way by the
necessity of correlating our various sensations. All the later
steps become necessary as soon as we have made the pri-
mary assumption, viz., that we may compare things in respect
of time alone or in respect of space alone. That is implicitly
to assume that any two periods or distances have a definite
numerical relation, and thus virtually to define time or space
to be that which is uniform when the varying indications
have been discarded. By the help of the various artifices
which have been indicated we can always discard every
inconsistent indication, because inconsistent; or, in the
last resort, determine it to be an illusion. The process is
of course facilitated by the fact that there are a great many
things of approximately constant length in space as in time,
so that our first rough assumptions are frequently justified.
We have given concrete constants which do in fact corre-
spond to real constants. And, in the next place, the process
is facilitated in space as in time by the extreme vagueness
of the supposed uniform element. Thus, for example, I can
easily believe that the time which has elapsed during my
walk is precisely the same as the time which has elapsed
for you, who have been sitting still, because the vague feeling
of duration from which alone I can immediately judge is so
vague that it easily conforms to any assumption as to a sup-
posed real or objective standard. If the time-feeling itself
were very distinct, and thus separately recognisable, it would
assert itself as something real, and I should find it compara-
tively difficult to apply the correction for personal error by
which it is forced to conform itself to other indications or
assumptions. As it is, there is no difficulty, or very little
difficulty, in reconstructing my guess so as to force it into
the desired harmony. Possibly it might be truer to say that
the sense of duration has become va#ue because it has been
forced to conform itself to my primary assumptions. The
same may apparently be said of the sense of extension. The
group of sensations which I take to indicate a particular
thing—a measuring-rod for example—are in the highest
degree distinct, and yet constantly varying for every position
of the object. I see a rod, we will suppose, and every sepa-
rate element of the visual sensation is perfectly distinct, so
that I could recognise the slightest change. As the position
of the rod changes the "whole group of sensations changes,
but I still regard the rod as the same. I take for granted,
that is, that it would alwayB correspond to precisely the
same extension to move my hand, for example, from one end
to the other, although the relation of the visual signals is
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entirely altered. It is, I say, always easy to suppose this,
because the sensation to be imagined is so vague that it easily
conforms to any imposed condition, and therefore to the
condition of assumed absolute identity. When, for any
reason, I suppose the rod to be the same, I can always
make it the same by an ideal construction which finds the
required materials perfectly plastic, as they have no marked
independent quality to give them rigidity.
It seems also to follow that this ultimate assumption may
remain for a long time implicit. We have to act in confor-
mity with geometrical principles before we have the slightest
power of framing a geometrical axiom. The definite signals
of sight determine certain actions without any conscious
reference to the construction by which they are ultimately
harmonised. This must be apparently the case in regard to
those complex combinations which take place before there
is any possibility of geometry, or perhaps any genuine space-
conception. Simple geometrical figures such as spheres and
straight lines and planes imply certain resemblances in the
sensible impressions which may be felt before they have been
definitely correlated and harmonised. The insect may make a
' bee-line' to a given point as a stone falls in a straight line,
not because it recognises a straight line in the full meaning
of the word, but simply because it is a symmetrically con-
structed machine, which moves in a straight line by the
action of its wings. The flat may more or less distinguish
itself from the rough and the round from the angular in the
undeveloped intelligence, which merely perceives some sort
of resemblance before it has the shghtest power of accepting
one of Euclid's definitions. We may at an early stage be
in possession of an empirical geometry which corresponds
roughly to the folly developed geometry. We do not yet
know as a necessary truth that two sides of a triangle are
greater than the third. Still we may move in a straight
fine to a given point before we can reason about lines. It
is true as a general rule, though it is not true without excep-
tion, that it requires less effort to move along one side of a
triangle than along the other two. Before we have any dis-
tinct knowledge of what ' sides' and ' triangle' mean, we
may have the sensations which ultimately enable us to infer
the straightness of particular lines, and may have roughly
grouped them together. We may then perceive that the
effort required for moving along the one is greater than the
effort required for moving along the two. While we had no
distinct conceptions of straightness or of fines, the proposi-
tion would still be empirical; it would be only true on the
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average, because we could not assign the conceptions or
make the necessary corrections. We could not distinguish
between the effort due to the space and that due to any
accidental circumstances. "We should be in the same posi-
tion in respect of space as we are in respect of time when
we have only an impression that events synchronise or
overlap and have not yet obtained any standard measure.
If space was still measured by mere effort, it would appear
that a zig-zag line up a hill was shorter than a direct
ascent. As we learn properly to classify our varying
sensations, the conception of space will gradually emerge
and afterwards the whole system of geometrical truths.
But the construction must be supposed to supervene
upon a rough classification already adopted and gradu-
ally becoming distinct and precise as we form the neces-
sary postulates.
So far the processes of forming a space-measure appear
to be precisely analogous to the process of forming a
time-measure. We have now to consider the farther
process in which time ceases to present any analogy to
space. Time, as we know it, has only one, whereas
space has three dimensions. The statement, ' So many
years after or before the birth of Christ,' is an exhaustive
answer to the question, When? I assume an arbitrary
era and an arbitrary period, and, assigning the ratio of the
period required to the fixed period, I must also call the
past negative if I call the future positive; but in answering
+ or - 1000 years A.D. I answer the question completely.
When you ask where a point is, my answer must be more
complex. I must not only say so many miles from Green-
wich Observatory, but add so many miles in such a direction;
or, according to the ordinary method, so many miles north
(or south), so many east (or west), and so many above (or
below). It is, of course, owing to this that geometry gives
rise to a system of necessary truths, not identical with
arithmetical truth generally, but corresponding to certain
definite arithmetical functions. As we may define the
position of any point in a variety of ways, the various
formulffl may be equated, and are ' necessarily' equivalent
to each other. We have to consider, then, how we obtain
those primary axioms from which all the subordinate
theorems are deduced by familiar processes. We have
actually unravelled the problem as soon as we have con-
structed our space-conceptions. The question is what
principles were tacitly implied in this construction. To
make this evident would be to show how far they were valid
or necessary.
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Let me, then, endeavour to bring out the logic of the
procedure actually adopted. By the logic I mean of course
the implicit not the explicit logic—the principles actually
embodied in the formation of our intuitions, though not
recognised in forming them.
What is the problem before us? We have to compare
certain indications of the senses in such a way as to secure
consistency. I have stated at sufficient length what are the
artifices by which we discard any apparent inconsistencies.
In applying them, we have virtually made assumptions
implying again certain relations in our modes of measure-
ment, which may also be regarded as limitations upon the
possibilities of our method. To exhibit in detail what are
these relations and the resulting limitations is to show the
' origin' of our geometrical axioms We have, in the first
place, assumed the absolute homogeneity of space. The
origin is absolutely arbitrary; or, in other words, precisely
the same relations must be obtainable from any origin
whatever. To regard the origin as fixed or to take it as our
starting-point is the same thing. We assume also that there
is only one space, or that any point in space is equally
accessible from any other. We take for granted the
unity of the world common to ourselves and our fellow-
creatures. And so far we make an assumption identical
with that which we make in the case of time.
We may, as I have said, select an arbitrary origin.
We lose nothing in the generality of our results by that
first assumption. We have next to assume an arbitrary
distance as in time we assume an arbitrary period; and,
again, we have as in time to regard this as the measure of
all other distances. And here occurs our difficulty. Given
an era and a period in time, the other point of time is
absolutely fixed. Any other time is given t>y assigning the
ratio of the times; the common measure being some unit
regarded ultimately as constant because an identical process
vould occupy it at any time. We are unable, as has been
sufficiently said, to compare times ' in themselves,' that is,
as compared irrespectively of the concrete events by which
they are occupied. In space we have a similar difficulty,
but a different solution. Two equal distances can be
compared only by the concrete things which occupy them.
They are equal if the same thing which occupies one could,
without change in its internal space-relations, occupy the
other. The fact that any particular thing is thus constant
can only be known by experience. The test, however, of
equality or its definition is always the possibility of super-
1 4
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position ; which by the foregoing is precisely equivalent to
the statement that the same series of sensations, whatever
they may be, would be given to me if my position were
altered as is actually given to another person at a different
position. Thus, again, in space as in time, we judge of the
identity of the thing signified from the sign, supposed to
remain the same, and not inversely. I do not directly
compare the sensation given to me by the stick in one
position and another, and therefore infer that it is the same
stick ; but I assume it for some other reason to be the same
stick, and therefore a sign of potentially identical relations.
I return to the remark already made. We have arbitrarily
assumed an origin and a distance. But a point (A) which
is at a given distance is not thereby a determinate point.
For every sensation of touch or sight is a multiple sensa-
tion, implying the coexistence of an indefinite number of
points, of which, again, an indefinite number are equally
within reach, or identical in respect of distance after making
the corrections for variation already explained. This, I
take it, is the problem set to us by our sensations ; that it is
so set, must be taken as a fact not capable of further
explanation ; and the only question is how we deal with it
and what is implied in our method of dealing with it. The
definition by distance alone does not define A, but defines
it as one of a multitude of A's. And here, again, the selec-
tion of any one of these A's is absolutely arbitrary. That is
to say, the fundamental assumption of homogeneity implies
that I may take any one,—when whatever relations I find to
the whole system would be identical with those which I
should have found by assuming any other ; or, again—which
is the same thing—that any one of the A's may be super-
posed upon any of the others, correlative change of course
taking place in them. Whether I state the identity in
objective or subjective language, as though the point moved
or my determination of the pomt varied, makes no difference.
But now we must proceed a step further. What is to be
the common measure of distance ? How can we apply it to
a system of comparable distances, when we are hampered
by this indeterminate element ?
Here we are dealing with a familiar difficulty. We can-
not define lines and angles apart from each other. An angle
is only intelligible as a relation between two lines ; and a
line must always be defined as having a fixed direction. We
can distinguish but cannot separate. At present we are not
even entitled to speak of the conceptions of lines and angles.
We can only assume the facts given to us and the funda-
1 4
 at The U
niversity of British Colom
bia Library on June 28, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
ON SOME KINDS OF NECESSARY TBUTH. (n . ) 203
mental doctrine of the homogeneity of space. We must
suppose, that is, that there are an indefinite number of A's,
all of which correspond to an identical distance-value, any
one of which may be Buperposed on any other or taken as
the base of our comparisons. To select one is again the
same thing as to assume an initial direction. Further, if
we suppose a second A (say B) to be determined, it must—
since it is still to be a point in the one homogeneous space
—have a certain definite distance-relation to the first A.
Our assumptions again show that the constancy of this
relation means the superposability (without the alteration
of any of the mutual relations) of A/B' upon AB. We must
start, therefore, with the assumption that we have an indefi-
nite number of coexistent points, all of which are identical
in respect of distance-relation from our assumed origin, and
each of which again has to any other a certain relation of
distance which is determined when the direction of both is
determined and the equality of which is to be tested by
super-posability.
But now, in order to compare these relations, we must
have a common measure. How are we to measure distance ?
We cannot compare the distance as we compare a separable
quahty—a smell or a sound, for example—and pronounce
distances to be equal because we recognise their intrinsic
identity. All that we have been able to say is that various
sensible signals may correspond to an identical distance, and
that if they do so they are superposable. But we can or
must make a further assumption. The uniform element
which we suppose to exist implies some real permanent
identity, which, whatever else may be said of it, has nothing
to do with direction. If I take the whole system of A's
which correspond to a fixed distance (a sphere, of course), it
must be capame of exactly coinciding with an exactly similar
system taken from any other origin. This follows from the
assumed homogeneity of space. And further, whatever the
principle in virtue of which this coincidence would take place
or would not take place, it cannot include any reference to
direction—that is, to the principle which determines only the
selection of one of the whole system of points. We virtually
eliminate the element of direction by taking all the directions,
and the same process, whatever it may be, must apply in
the same way to every origin. Hence, the possibility of
superposition depends upon some quality or indicates some
identical sensation having no relation whatever to direction.
But we now wish to compare different distances. In one
sense the distance of any point from an origin is absolutely
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indeterminate Any point is accessible from any other.
Therefore, although we must suppose that any point A is at
a given distance in the sense that it is superposable without
change in the distance-relation upon a fixed point, we might
arrive at it through an indefinite number of points. Any
series whatever might be part of a series which ultimately
leads us to A, and if we suppose each step in the process to
be somehow determinate, we should get an indefinite number
of determinants of A. But the question now is how is this
determination to be effected ? How are we to get rid of the
arbitrary term introduced by the identity in distance of an
indefinite number of points differing in direction ?
Here we come, I think, upon another necessary assump-
tion—on a postulate which we must take for granted in
order to correlate, our impressions, that is, to interpret our
sensations consistently. We have already made an arbitrary
assumption of an origin, a distance and a direction—the
last assumption being equivalent to the arbitrary selection
of one of the equidistant points. We are entitled to do this
by the fundamental assumption of the homogeneity of space.
This is to say again that from any origin whatever we may
find a precisely identical system of relations. But the
question now occurs how two such systems are to be com-
pared. The distance corresponds to a something supposed
to be fixed, though we cannot define it apart from its signs.
But what are we to say of the direction, that is, of the
principle of selection among the equidistant points ? We
should get a precisely similar set of relations if we supposed
that any direction from you were to be the same as a given
direction from me. All the other directions would then
follow; and your whole system is then superposable upon
mine in an indefinite variety of ways. (I get this identity,
that is, whether I identify your north with my north or
with my south or east.) How then am I to compare
directions from different points ? I can suppose the
distances to be superposed, and their coincidence gives the
test of equality. The two distances are the same as two
smells or sounds are the same. But the difficulty here is
that I must compare directions on the very supposition that
they are not to be superposed. Therefore my method of
comparison fails ; I should annihilate by applying it the
very condition under which the statement is to be valid.
The difficulty, in short, arises from the familiar fact that we
cannot be in two places at once. It manifests itself in our
geometry by the familiar perplexity about parallel straight
fines, that is, of lines which are constant in direction
although different in position.
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At the same time we cannot regard the direction from
different origins as independent. We cannot do so, because
I have to construct space by annexing your world. I have
to appropriate your consciousness or, if we choose to say so,
my own at a different position ; I have to be in two places
at once, or, at least, to reason as if I were in both at once.
Suppose, in fact, that I regard any two points A and B as
determined relatively to me. Then by my assumption of
the unity and homogeneity of space I must also suppose A
to be at a given distance from B, and either of them to be
determinable from the other out of all points at that
distance in virtue of some principle of selection. There is
some rule, whatever it may be, in virtue of which we take
the particular B out of all the points at a distance BA, that
is, fix the direction of B relatively to A. Moreover, since
this must ex hypotTusi be the same from whatever origin I
contemplate A and B, it must be something independent of
any term involving distance. Or, again, if I suppose identi-
cal formula to be applied from a fixed origin, I shall get the
same formula for the direction or principle of selection of a
variety of AB's. Hence, though direction in itself remains
as incapable of definition as distance, it follows that direction
or distance are independent variables and that the direction
must be somehow determinable by a formula which includes
no reference to position or, in other words, will be the same
for every origin. Thus, though we cannot separate a line
from its direction any more than we can separate an event
from the time in which it happens, and though direction can
only be described as something in virtue of which one point
out of a multitude is selected and has then some given
distance-relation to every other point, we can say that
distances must be comparable independently of direction
and origin, and that direction must be regarded as somehow
corresponding to a determination equally independent of
position, although this cannot be reduced to a direct in-
tuition.
So much, I argue, is imposed upon us by the data from
which we start, and the necessity of consistent interpretation.
We have now to apply this to the problem of a measure of
distance. The unit of distance is arbitrarily assumed when
we assume any point A. We can, again, speak of any mul-
tiple of this unit; and as a distance may be broken up into
subordinate distances (since we may proceed from any point
to any other), we may regard it as a sum of equal distances
or as measurable in terras of one dimension. But we have
still the ambiguity arising from the element of direction.
1 •'. •
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The position of a point is given if we take any point A at a
fixed distance and then determine a particular point at that
distance by its direction; and again, there are an indefinite
number of possible determinants when we suppose that we
reach a point through various series of determined points.
Thus we must suppose that any point corresponds to a dis-
tance affected in some way by a direction and also to a sum
of distances each affected in some way by a direction; and
we also know that the distances and the directions are such
that their measures are absolutely independent of each other
and of position. Again, the relations between distances must
be independent of the arbitrary unit assumed. We may
reckon in yards or miles as we may reckon in days or years,
and call any given distance 1 or 100 or y ^ . And, again, it
can make no difference whether we suppose the standard
of measurement to vary or the distance itself to vary—whe-
ther we speak, that is, in objective or subjective terms. No
property of space, that is, no relation between the distances,
can depend upon the absolute magnitude. We do not think
it necessary to say explicitly in Euclid that the properties of
a circle or a triangle are the same whether the side or radius
be an inch or a mile. The impossibility of any such depend-
ence upon absolute magnitude is already implied in the
assumed homogeneity of space It is therefore implied that
we may suppose distance to vary whilst the direction-factor
remains unaltered. That is, that the term corresponding to
direction applies now to the doubled or halved distance
instead of the original distance. If so, it is implied that the
determinants of any point A will equally determine a series
of points when the distance varies, so that for every fixed
value of the distance there will be a fixed corresponding
value of each determinant. So much, I mean to argue,
follows from the form of the arithmetical function and the
independence of the two variables involved. Since we have
assumed that neither of them has any relation to position,
nor to each other, we are forced to suppose a distance varying
independently of direction, and which will give equal mea-
sures of distance for equal variations.
If this be sound (and though I may very likely have ex-
pressed myself inaccurately, I think that I am aiming at a
sound argument), it follows that in selecting any A out of
the equidistant A's I have virtually selected a series of
which A may be called the index, and which differ from A
solely as at a greater or less distance. A being once assumed,
a definite variation in distance must give a definite A' in the
same direction, but at twice or half the distance. But this is
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the desired measure of distance. The same series must have
been reached if we had started from any other point in the
series, for a reciprocal variation would have given the same
A. Or, again, we may suppose any other point in the series
to be taken as the origin. Any part representing a given
distance must be capable of absolutely coinciding with any
other part representing the same distance. The homogeneity
of space, again, implies that any two points may be thus re-
lated. If two points are regarded as fixed (or, what is the
same thing, taken as the base of measurement), they must
therefore be connected by such a series in which any point
is fixed (or determined in regard to them) when its distance
is given in terms of a standard distance. If, again, any
other point is assumed to preserve all its relations to these
points, and therefore to all the points absolutely determined
through them, all positions consistent with these relations
must be ' symmetrical' with respect to this given series;
that is, if it can take a series of positions they must be dis-
tinguishable from each other only in virtue of a new arbi-
trary assumption; or taking any one of them, the same series
of relations must give all the others, since otherwise space
would not be homogeneous. The series represents length
without breadth, for there can be only one point for a given
distance : it defines a single direction, which is equivalent to
the axiom that there cannot be two lines parallel to a given
line, that is, in the same direction, through a given point.
That is, we have the properties of a straight line.
Now, as a fact, we seem to find the straight line ready
made. We assume in our geometrical reasonings that it has
the properties in question, and we start, therefore, from
them. This is necessary because, as I have said, we are
forced to argue from the sign and not from the thing signi-
fied. We only compare distances or directions by super-
position, real or imaginary, of the signs, and argue that, if
unaltered, they must represent the same things. This, how-
ever, upon my showing, must represent a previous elabora-
tion by which the intuitive perceptions are made to give
harmonious results.
I have, in fact, argued that we really organise space by
assuming that any and every point is the index of a line; or
that there exists between any two points whatever a relation
precisely analogous to the time-relation, although this rela-
tion does not fully determine either point from the other, as
in the case of time, and consequently requires the assignment
of the other element—direction. In both time and space
we are comparing our sensations by assuming a common
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measure; though, in the case of time, we have a sufficient
measure by giving the ratio of one period to another, while
in space we have to make the hypothesis that any two points
can be related by a precisely analogous measure. The rest
follows. We have virtually solved the problem when we
have so organised our perceptions as to imply this abstrac-
tion. But, of course, we do not at first contemplate the
problem in this way. We only learn from the actual solu-
tion what were the conditions of successful solution. The
psychological problem—how our perceptions come to con-
stitute themselves in this scheme—is therefore an indepen-
dent question which I certainly am not competent to attack,
though I will venture a remark or two upon its general
nature.
We interpret a certain system of signs, let us say, as
representing a set of fixed relations. This stick or this table
is a rigid body in space. In order to think of it as rigid, I
have to supply a number of potential relations different from
those inferable from the actual sensations at a given time.
The signals of sight, for example, suggest certain distances
from me of different points, and also certain distances of
those points from each other ; and when I further assert the
body to be rigid, I state that this latter set of distances
remains constant. The rigid body is that which preserves
the same internal space-relations, and that whether I sup-
pose the body to move or my base of measurement to move.
When, therefore, I take a certain varying set of signals to
indicate a constant, I have to make certain corrections and
to draw a whole set of tacit inferences, which cannot, there-
fore, be regarded as the immediate product of the sensations
themselves. Suppose, for example, that I have a certain
visual sensation varying in magnitude. I interpret it to
indicate the swing of a pendulum or the rotation of the
sails of a windmill as seen from a point in the plane of
rotation. I can, as we know, interpret the same signals to
mean rotation in either of two directions, or, again, not to
mean rotation at all, but the protrusion and retraction of
an actual object. That is, for whatever reason, I infer
that the actually varying signal corresponds to a potential
fixed set of relations, and therefore fixed signals to a varying
Serson. This inference, therefore, supposes a process con-ucted according to certain pre-established rules, in virtue
of which it is made. And, further, if I find in any way that
the inference fails, I remodel the potential sensations, in-
stead of assuming the inference to be illogical. My space-
perceptions remain, though my interpretation of the particular
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phenomenon varies. I reject the hypothesis of rotation;
then there must be protrusion. But the protrusion is for
some reason regarded as impossible. Then there must be
illusion; that is, the experience inconsistent with the
geometry is rejected because inconsistent, and is therefore
not the source of the geometry.
Yet this is consistent with the hypothesis that in space, as
in time, the geometry is the product of the assumption that
the sensations must be correlated or that the interpretation
must be made on such principles as to secure the correlation.
ThuB, in the first place, the construction of space must be
facilitated by the fact that we have, as in time, a number of
empirically given constants. The assumption that my
hand or foot is of constant length is suggested and
ultimately verified (or approximately verified) through
experience like the assumption that the day is a constant in
time. And this generally correct assumption must be of
essential importance in enabling me to interpret the signals
and to read off this and that varying indication as cor-
responding to the same set of constant potential relations.
The problem which we have to solve is thus placed before
us in a comparatively simple form, though from the
particular case we could not infer the general principle. A
more varying set of sensations might have indefinitely
increased the difficulty. It might be curious to ask, for
example, how long we should have been in working out a
coherent set of geometrical conceptions if light did not come
in straight lines. Probably the blind might then have been
the best geometers. But, in any case, some system of
interpretation obviously becomes necessary. We assume,
rightly or wrongly, that A is a fixed point relatively to us;
say, e.g., the end of the axle of a rotating wheel. Then the
assumption that A is part of a rigid body, or that every
other point preserves its relations to A and to me, con-
sistently with varying space-relations to other objects,
shows that in some way there must be fixed relations
between these varying relations, and it must be my problem
to interpret them on some fixed system. All I can say, at
first sight, is that if the signals still signify the same thing
they are superposable ; and I have to consider what are the
conditions of this identity, or how a given change will
affect other changes. I may then find that I have tacitly
assumed a thing to be fixed which I have yet at the same
time supposed to be variable. It is, of course, in exhibiting
this superposability that all geometry consists. The
measure must be so contrived as to admit of its systematic
14
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and invariable application, and, farther, must be the simplest
upon which the assumed data can be correlated. I have
argued, again, that we proceed by assuming the absolute
homogeneity of space, and by then virtually disentangling
the complexity arising from the distinction of distance and
direction. It is obvious that our attention must be called
to the element of direction. From the earliest period of
animated life, the importance of recognising variability of
direction, for example, is obvious. If we were, like sea-
anemones, irrevocably rooted to a simple spot, we might
regard the different sensations corresponding to different
directions simply as varying though resembling sensations
not needing to be correlated at all; but as soon as we say
this is the same stick, though it is held horizontally or
vertically, we must make an abstraction of the qualities in
respect of which it is held to be the same. Our great
difficulty, indeed, is to avoid thinking of verticality as some-
thing absolute or necessarily having the same direction for
every part of the universe, or, in other words, to separate the
geometrical relations from the accidental relation of gravita-
tion. As long as we lump the sense of resistance which
corresponds to weight with the purely geometrical relation,
only occasionally connected with it, we have not got our
geometry quite clear. But when we once identify the stick,
as the same in size though different in direction, we have
made the decisive step towards clearing our perceptions; and
we have recognised the fact that the two determinations are
independent. Without inquiring, therefore, what are the
precise psychological steps involved, or trying the difficult
feat of getting back into a pregeometrical frame of mind, we
can vaguely surmise the way m which this essential step is
or may be forced upon us.
We now have to ask what more is involved in our assump-
tions. To consider one point as fixed is to consider a series
of points as fixed. Any other point which has fixed relations
to these points iB subject to further conditions through our
assumption of the homogeneity of space; and we have next to
ask how many indeterminate relations remain, or how many
arbitrary assumptions are at our disposal, or, which is the
same thing, how many more relations can be represented
upon these assumptions.
We started by the perfectly arbitrary selection of an
origin and a distance, and the assumption that there may be
an indefinite number of points identical in distance and
varying in direction. Suppose, then, that we take any two
such points. Whatever is true of either, or of its relation to
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the other, may be said of the other and its relation to the
first. The distinction in virtue of which we call one A and
the other B is purely arbitrary, and we might interchange the
names without making any difference to the truth of our
statements. (We may always argue safely from the fact, that
we can see no difference between the cases, or that there is
no reason why they should differ to the fact that they do not
differ, because we have assumed that there is to be no
difference or that we are to ' see' in such a way as to make
no difference.) But we have only to consider this relation
from another point of view, and to apply the previous
considerations to see that it involves another proposition.
The two points imply a straight line, and the third point
(namely, the origin from which they are equidistant) implies
another straight line, which must be absolutely symmetrical
with respect to this line. For, we may assume as fixed, or
take for a new^ origin the point in the line joining the two
given points which is equally related to both of them.
The two directions indicated by them only differ in this,
that if either is called positive the other is called negative.
The line indicated by the previous origin must also—when
regarded from this new origin—have identical relations to
these two branches. One might be superposed upon the
other, the symmetrical line remaining constant; or every
point along that line will have identical relations to
equidistant points in positive and negative directions along
the other. This is implied, therefore, in our primary as-
sumption as to the mode of measuring the relations in
question. Therefore (as, from the homogeneity of space,
what is true of one line or point is true of every line or
point), we have already implied that a symmetrical line may
be drawn from any point m any other line; and if one line
IB symmetrical to another in this sense, the other line is
obviously symmetrical to it.
Supposing, again, that we take any two such lines, we
have any point in either of them given by a simple ratio,
that is, by its proportion to an arbitrary distance; and,
further, any points so taken also represent a fixed line any
point of which is determinable in the same way, or, in other
words, we have the plane. This is fixed when the two
symmetrical lines are fixed, and any point which is in the
plane and not in the symmetrical lines is not symmetrical
with respect to them, though it will have a corresponding
point as we take the negative instead of the positive branch
of the other line for its determinant.
Now, as we took the first two points arbitrarily, the ques-
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tion remains whether the symmetry of one line to another
at a given point is or iB not a sufficient determination. Is
there only one such line, or may there be many ? We know
of course, as a matter of fact, that there are many ; and I
do not see any a priori proof, that is, any proof dependent on
the assumptions already made, that there can be only one
such line. If such a proof could be suggested it would be a
reductio ad absurdum of my argument. I shall take for
granted that it does not exist. I do not see, on the other
hand, any proof that there must be more such lines than one,
except, indeed, from the consideration, whatever it may be
worth, that we must push our system as far as it will go,
that is to say, until it appears to involve contradictions.
Otherwise we should not extract from our method all that
it is capable of giving, or, in other words, we shall have no
means of determining some relations which are determinable
through it. We might, that is, confine ourselves to space
of two dimensions, though it is desirable to take into account
as many dimensions as are possible. We will suppose,
therefore, that if two symmetrical lines be given, the other
lines absolutely determinable through them, as above stated,
cannot be symmetrical, but that there may be more sym-
metrical lines than one differing from any of these.
We assume then, as before, a fixed line through a fixed
point, both determinations being absolutely arbitrary. Then
we suppose a second line symmetrical to the first, which, by
the above, is always possible. To suppose again that there
are more such lines than one is to suppose many lines, all
haying identical relations to the first line, or all superposable
while it remains constant. But these again taken, all other
lines must form a symmetrical system; for, since they all have
precisely the same relation to the fixed line, they are not
distinguishable in virtue of that relation, that is, in virtue of
any assumption yet made. Therefore, if distinguishable,
they are distinguishable only in virtue of Borne property of
space—an assumption inconsistent with the homogeneity of
space—or, finally, only distinguishable in virtue of another
absolutely arbitrary assumption ; so that, starting from any
one, we get precisely the same series by the same relations.
Here, therefore, we may or must make another arbitrary
assumption, namely, of one of the symmetrical lines. Taking
the fixed line OX and the symmetrical Line thus arbitrarily
selected OY, we have thus a system of OY's, one of which iB
arbitrarily taken as fixed. One case of the OY's will of
course be that which is represented by inverting the positive
and negative determinations ; and, as we may start from
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either, it is plain that if we may assume any other position
than OT we may take an OY (say OZ) symmetrical again
with respect to the two branches of OY. We must be able,
if we snppose the OY variable at all, to assume that it can
generate a system precisely similar to that defined by a
fixed OX and OY. The OZ has, that is, a relation to
OY identical with that which OY has to OX. It therefore
follows necessarily that, if OY be not determined from its
symmetry to OX alone, there must be a third axis OZ
which, by the mode in which we have reached it, is sym-
metrical both with respect to OX and to OY. It is also
symmetrical with respect to all the points determined
absolutely through OX and OY, or to the plane XY, for the
identity of the relations of the positive and negative branches
apply equally to all the points determined through OX and
OY alone, as the new factors are dependent solely upon these
terms ; and similarly OX is symmetrical with respect to it as
it is symmetrical with respect to every one of its positions,
and OY again with respect to OX and OZ. Further, if OZ
is supposed fixed, we now have all the points dependent
upon, or determinable through, the three axes equally
determined.
The only question is whether OZ is fixed, or whether
we have still an arbitrary element at our disposal. If so,
we should have again to apply precisely the same reasoning
as before. Taking any OZ corresponding to the given con-
ditions, and supposing that there were many OZ's all ful-
filling the same conditions, and then arbitrarily selecting
one of them, it follows as before, that, since every particular
OZ has these relations and is therefore absolutely indepen-
dent of them, we must have another OZ, say OW> sym-
metrical with respect to OZ. But OZ is defined as the line
(or a line) symmetrical with respect to OX and OY. We
have therefore to suppose a line symmetrical with respect
to all three axes, and we have shown that a line sym-
metrical with respect to any two, say OX, OY, is neces-
sarily different from the line symmetrical with respect
to two others, OY and OZ ; in fact, it is not identical with
it but symmetrical with respect to it. Therefore we are
attempting an impossibility already excluded by our assump-
tions. When we took any two symmetrical lines, OX and
OY, OX was symmetrical with respect to OY, and OY with
respect to OX, or the relation was absolutely reciprocal.
When we introduce a third, any two give the other, and we
find a fourth symmetrical with respect to all these to be an
impossibility, or to correspond to contradictory determina-
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tions. Hence we have exhausted the resources of our
method when we have reached the three dimensions.
This, of course, does not represent our actual logic, but
represents the conditions virtually implied in our mode of
reasoning. We have first assumed the homogeneity of
space, and then, to meet the difficulty arising from the non-
determination of a point by a simple assignment of distance,
we have assumed that any two points are measurable by a
method identical with that employed in the case of time;
and have finally become conscious of the limits virtually
imposed by the assumption. I admire my own audacity in
thinking as if I really believed in my own reasoning, but I
cannot help fancying that it may be possible for some
better qualified person to work out the problem more
successfully. The result would, I think, be to the follow-
ing effect. I have tried to show what is the logic by
following an actual line of reasoning, and endeavouring
to assign the general principle in virtue of which it is
valid. I observed at starting that we could obtain neces-
sary truths in regard to certain empirical propositions,
those of genealogy for example, when the general truths
of arithmetic are applicable m virtue of our assumptions
to certain particular cases. Thus we find that the
genealogical problem comes simply to a case of counting
the number of descents from common ancestors, the required
data being implied by the statement under consideration.
Such a process is much easier when we take the particular
case instead of dealing with the abstract formulae ; and there
is always a corresponding difficulty in discriminating the
general principle from the particular set of facts in which
it is imbedded! This is certainly very great in the case of
geometry. The abstract principle would not by itself
suggest the particular case. I, at least, can only satisfy
myself, or seem to satisfy myself, that it does apply by
following out the particular application; and there is a
constant danger in starting from the other end of assuming
the very point to be proved, and attributing the necessity to
the familiar empirical truth instead of to the general abstract
principle which it is so difficult to grasp by itself. At some
point geometrical problems come under the head of algebra,
or can be treated as simple arithmetical relations. The
question is, What are the assumptions which justify this, or
at what point does it become possible.
I have tried to suggest that the geometrical axioms emerge
under the necessity of correlating our various impressions,
and, therefore, by the help of certain assumptions. According
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to my view, they are not simple empirical truths, detected
by observation and conceivably different, inasmuch as they
already imply a certain system of comparison and the dis-
missal of observations which conflict with that system. Nor,
on the other hand, do I consider them to be the result of a
form arbitrarily imposed upon the sense-given symbols ; for,
as I have argued, they have emerged through the necessity of
combining those signals upon definite and consistent prin-
ciples. It is conceivable that we might have a simpler
system of comparison which would be adequate for a simpler
set of sensations ; or, again, that although the sense-percep-
tions are, as a fact, unique,1 we might have an entirely different
set of sensations, which would be comparable by a precisely
similar method, as, for example, by a possible elaboration of
the other senses ; or, finally, that we might have a more
complex system of sensations which could not be adequately
compared by this method. "When in fact we have to deal
with physical problems, involving higher functions of the
variables, we do not construct a new system of comparison or
a space of more dimensions, but are content to use the old
space, only stating the new law of variation in terms of the
old, and dispensing with any attempt to form a corresponding
intuition. I am, however, in danger of getting beyond my
depth, and am finally content to submit my arguments for
what they may be worth.
1
 They are probably unique beeatue it is convenient to reduce all our
modes of comparison to a single system.
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